UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25071
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3158th meeting of the Security Council, held on 8 January 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "Admission of new Members", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the members:

"The Security Council has just recommended to the General Assembly that the Czech Republic be admitted to membership in the United Nations. It is with great pleasure that, on behalf of the members of the Council, I congratulate the Czech Republic on this historic occasion.

"The Council notes with great satisfaction the Czech Republic's solemn commitment to uphold the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to fulfil all the obligations contained therein.

"We look forward to the day, in the near future, when the Czech Republic will join us as a Member of the United Nations and to working closely with its representatives."

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25072
11 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Canadian Government and in accordance with Security Council resolution 794 (1992), paragraph 18, I have the honour to inform you that Canada, on 4 December 1992 announced a contribution of one infantry battalion of 900 troops to participate in the Unified Command forces in Somalia. This replaces Canada's earlier commitment of up to 750 military personnel for peace-keeping duties with the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Canadian battalion is now fully deployed to Somalia and has established a command centre in the vicinity of Belet Uen where the battalion will contribute to the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. The Canadian Commander at Belet Uen has initiated discussions with local leaders as part of a civil-military process. Canada has also committed one supply ship, the HMCS Preserver, to provide logistical and medical support for the Canadian battalion as well as for the Unified Command.

In addition, since January 1992 Canada has contributed $22.8 million in humanitarian assistance to Somalia and Somali refugees in neighbouring countries. Canada is also supporting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees programme in Ethiopia, which includes refugees from Somalia. In response to the Somalia airlift operation which began on 12 September, Canada has provided three Hercules C-130 cargo aircraft to support the operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross and World Food Programme. The provision of Canadian aircraft for the airlift has been extended to 31 January.

The Government of Canada looks forward to receiving an early consolidated report on national contributions to the enforcement action in Somalia as well as continuing reports on the progress to date in the implementation of resolution 794 (1992).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Louise FRECHETTE
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

93-01540 5524a (E) 110193

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25073
9 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note of 26 October 1992 concerning Security Council resolution 778 (1992), has the honour to communicate the following.

The Central Bank of Cyprus has, with reference to paragraphs 1 and 4 of Security Council resolution 778 (1992), surveyed all domestic and offshore banks in Cyprus regarding any Iraqi funds that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi pertroleum or petroleum products, paid for by or on behalf of the purchaser on or after 6 August 1990, and any transaction relating thereto. The conclusions of the survey are the following:

1. There are no funds of the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations or agencies that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products, deposited in any bank in Cyprus.

2. There exist three unsettled letters of credit issued before August 1990, by three different local banks, in favour of Iraqi State organizations, by order of Cypriot petroleum importers (oil companies) for a total amount of US$ 6,782,450.94. The Cypriot oil companies received the Iraqi petroleum before August 1990, but they have not yet made any payments to the local banks which opened the letters of credit.

3. Concurrently, Iraq owes several Cypriot exports a total amount in excess of US$ 23 million for goods supplied prior to the imposition of United Nations sanctions.

4. There are no other transactions relating to sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products on or after 6 August 1990.

With respect to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 778 (1992) the Permanent Mission of Cyprus wishes to inform the Secretary-General that there are no petroleum or petroleum products owned by the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations or agencies, in Cyprus.

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25074
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting under paragraph 1 of Article 35 of the United Nations Charter, in light of the incident in which the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Hakija Turajlic, was murdered by Serbian extremists while under protection of UNPROFOR, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests an emergency meeting of the Security Council.

Mr. Turajlic was returning from Butmir airport in an UNPROFOR vehicle escorted by other UNPROFOR vehicles on a United Nations controlled road. The UNPROFOR convoy was blocked by two tanks belonging to aggressor forces. Serbian extremists then entered the vehicle with force and shot Mr. Turajlic eight times. He has been pronounced dead.

Excellency, this blatant act of war against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United Nations demands immediate and resolute action, including the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter, to stop the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to stop the use of UNPROFOR's limited mandate as a means to facilitate aggression.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

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UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/858
S/25075
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda items 30, 35, 73 and 74
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 8 January 1993 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum on the deporations by Israel, the occupying Power, of Palestinian civilians from the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem (see annex). The memorandum covers the more recent mass deportation by the Government of Israel of more than 400 Palestinian civilians, on 17 December 1992, as well as background information on the subject as a whole. It also includes our own conclusions with regard to the subject.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 30, 35, 73, and 74, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Nasser AL-KIDWA
Permanent Observer of
Palestine to the
United Nations

ANNEX

Memorandum on the deportations by Israel, the occupying Power, of Palestinian civilians from the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem

1. The Israeli Government's mass deportation of more than 400 Palestinian civilians on 17 December 1992

- On 16 December 1992, the Israeli Government took the unprecedented step of ordering the summary deportation of 418 Palestinian civilians from the occupied Palestinian territory. The Israeli authorities placed those Palestinians, blindfolded and bound, in buses and drove them to Israel's northern border.

- Upon the leakage of information on the deportation, human rights activists, including lawyers, petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court for a restraining order. The Court granted the stay order and convened to discuss the appeal. After 15 hours, it allowed the deportation orders to proceed.

- Meanwhile, the Israeli authorities returned a number of Palestinian civilians from the buses and several others were brought by helicopter to join the deportees. After an overnight stay in the buses, 415 were driven, on 17 December 1992, into South Lebanon across the so-called security zone, and were dumped in the freezing winter weather in a mountainous area between the Israeli/So-Called South Lebanon Army checkpoint and the Lebanese army checkpoint.

- Israel refused to release the names of the deportees, and did not notify their families of the measures taken. In addition, no individual charges for any criminal act had been made against those deported, and none of them received a copy of their deportation orders. (After approximately two weeks, the Israeli authorities announced that they had made a mistake with regard to at least 10 of the deportees.)

- On 18 December 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 799 (1992), in which the Council, strongly condemned the action taken by Israel and demanded "that Israel, the occupying Power, ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied territories of all those deported". The Council also requested the Secretary-General "to consider dispatching a representative to the area to follow up with the Israeli Government with regard to this serious situation and to report to the Security Council".

- The deportees tried to go back, on foot, along the same route that they were brought, but they were prevented from doing so due to shooting and shelling directed at them by the Israeli army. Such shelling was repeated several times at later dates.

- In the meantime, the Lebanese Government, on the grounds that the deportations carried out by Israel violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, and that those deportees had been illegally brought onto Lebanese territory, refused to accept the deportees and refused to allow assistance to them, as they are solely the responsibility of the Israeli Government. It is worth mentioning that Security Council resolution 799 (1992) reaffirmed "the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon".

- The Secretary-General, in respose to the request made by the Council, dispatched Mr. James Jonah, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to the region from 27 to 30 December 1992. He met with Israeli officials, and he also met with Lebanese officials when he went to Lebanon.

- The actual situation of the deportees has been deteriorating due to the harshness of weather and a lack of all essentials, including water, medicine and foodstuffs. A number of them have become sick and several have been injured. Meanwhile, the Israeli Government rejected a formal request by the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide the deportees with the essential materials through Israel's borders.

- In a letter, dated 3 January 1993, the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed the President of the Security Council that "the mission of Mr. Jonah was unsuccessful". The Secretary-General stated, "From all that I have heard, I believe this is attributable primarily to Israel's unwillingness to comply with resolution 799". The Secretary-General also informed the Council that he decided to dispatch to the region a second mission, to be led by his special political advisor and representative to the multilateral peace talks on the Middle East, Mr. Chinmaya Gharekhan. The Secretary-General expressed his earnest hope that "the Israeli authorities will recognize the need to comply with resolution 799", however, he stated, "should this not be the case, I may have to recommend in my report that the Council consider taking further steps to ensure that its decision is respected".

At the United Nations, several committees and groups, such as the Committee on Palestine of the OIC, the Committee on Palestine of NAM, the Arab Group, and the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; issued strongly worded statements on the matter. All of those statements called for decisive actions by the Security Council to guarantee full implementation of resolution 799 (1992). Some called for a new resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

2. Background information on deportations

- Israel, the occupying Power, has deported approximately 2,500 Palestinian civilians since 1967. Its latest action in this regard, the deportation of more than 400 Palestinians, on 17 December 1992, constituted mass deportation.

Security Council resolutions on deportation:

- The United Nations Security Council adopted 11 resolutions specifically on the issue of deportation. These resolutions are 468 (1980), 469 (1980), 484 (1980), 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989), 641 (1989), 694 (1991), 726 (1992) and 799 (1992), in addition to resolution 681 (1990) which contained a paragraph on deportation. [In addition, there are a vast number of General Assembly resolutions, as well as resolutions of other organs of the United Nations, on the subject.]

- All of those resolutions condemned or deplored Israeli deportation policies and actions, and requested, in a variety of forms, that Israel, the occupying Power, guarantee the safe and immediate return of the deportees and desist from taking such actions.

- All of those resolutions, in addition to numerous other Security Council resolutions affirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to the occupied Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, which considers deportation to be illegal. Resolution 681 urged the Government of Israel "to accept the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the said Convention". To date, however, none of these resolutions have been heeded by the Israeli Government.

Deportation and international law:

- International law subjects the Israeli occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

- Article 49 of this Convention declares "individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons, from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive".

- According to the authoritative commentary, done by the International Committee of the Red Cross, on the Convention; this prohibition is "absolute and allows no exceptions". Several other statements of the Red Cross put forth the same position.

- Article 147 of the Convention considers "unlawful deportations" as a grave breach of the Convention. Article 146 of the Convention places specific duties upon the High Contracting Parties to repress grave breaches by seeking out and prosecuting the perpetrators.

- Article 1 of the Convention makes it the obligation of the High Contracting Parties "to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances".

- In brief, according to the Fourth Geneva Convention, deportation is not only illegal but also constitutes a grave breach of the Convention. Grave breaches of the Geneva Convention amount to war crimes. (The 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defined deportation as a war crime and a crime against humanity.)

Deportation and domestic law:

- Israel invokes Article 108 of the British Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 as the basis for its deportation orders. However, these regulations were in fact revoked by the British Government on the eve of the termination of the British Mandate in May 1948 and therefore, the Israeli Government, in terms of domestic law, is acting without legal basis in deporting Palestinian protected persons.

- Israel started to provide, during the 1970s, very inadequate legal review of deportation orders, which became possible only after more than a thousand Palestinians had already been deported without any form of due process. According to these procedures, a person can appeal a deportation order to a military advisory committee. If the order is confirmed by the committee, the person may petition the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice. The procedures are based solely on classified information, which is neither released to the deportee nor to his lawyer. The Israeli court has never revoked a deportation order.

- On 16 December 1992, even the above-mentioned procedures were abolished by a decision of the Government, the text of which was not published. In addition, the nature of the recent mass deportation ended another Israeli argument, which attempted, in the past, to differentiate between "accepted" individual and selected deportation as opposed to "prohibited" mass deportation.

- Ultimately, deportations are administrative orders taken by military commanders and not by any judicial authority, and not pursuant to a procedure which can be measured against due process criteria. They are extrajudicial punishments in the extreme.

3. Conclusions

- Deportation is illegal under international law and constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It is being carried out without legal basis in terms of domestic law. Deportation also violates numerous Security Council resolutions and represents fundamental disregard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all other human rights instruments and standards. The concept of deportation is parallel to the concept of "transfer" and other racist ideas and theories, such as ethnic cleansing.

- The deportation which took place on 17 December 1992, constitutes, in addition to the above, a form of collective punishment. It has had a detrimental effect on the peace process currently under way, under the co-sponsorship of the United States of America and the Russian Federation. It is inconceivable for the peace process to continue and succeed as long as this situation is not brought to an end.

- The international community, and specifically the Security Council, is duty-bound to compel Israel, a member of the United Nations, to abide by its obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and to guarantee respect of international law, especially the Fourth Geneva Convention. It is our firm belief that the Security Council has to proceed to adopt a new resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to ensure that Israel will accept and carry out previous relative resolutions, especially resolution 799 (1992), which demanded the safe and immediate return of all those deported, and we call upon the Council to do so.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25076
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I regret to have to inform the Security Council that the situation in Angola has deteriorated severely since the beginning of the year.

There have been outbreaks of heavy fighting in at least ten provincial capitals and other centres of population. Each side has accused the other of responsibility for initiating these hostilities. In almost all cases the outcome of the fighting has been that UNITA premises have been destroyed and its personnel captured and in some cases killed. Meanwhile, the Government has been unable to reestablish its administration in many rural areas and some two-thirds of the municipalities in Angola remain in UNITA's hands.

UNAVEM personnel who are deployed in more than 60 different locations in Angola, have been exposed to extreme danger as a result of these hostilities and in one case had to spend three days consecutively in slit trenches within their compound. It has been necessary to evacuate the UNAVEM teams from two provincial capitals.

My Special Representative has worked tirelessly to establish contacts between the two sides in order to restore the cease-fire and to relaunch the political dialogue which had begun quite promisingly at Namibe on 26 November. Military commanders on both sides have frequently spoken with each other via UNAVEM's communications and in some cases these contacts have had a beneficial effect. They cannot, however, be a substitute for face-to-face meetings and I am glad to be able to report that Miss Anstee has succeeded in obtaining the agreement of both sides in principle to a meeting between General Joao de Matos, Chief of General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, and General Demósthenes Chilingutila of UNITA. It has not however been possible to obtain agreement on the location of such a meeting, a number of proposals having been made by Miss Anstee but rejected by one side or the other.

Her latest proposal is for a meeting at Menongue, a city which has not so far been affected by the fighting, where, with the necessary assurances from both sides, UNAVEM would be able to assist in making the necessary logistic and security arrangements for a meeting.

Unless the fighting can be brought under control and dialogue restored between the two sides, it is difficult to see how the peace process in Angola can be saved. In these grave circumstances, I believe that it would be useful if the Security Council could publicly endorse my Special Representative's efforts and make a strong appeal to the two sides to agree to a meeting in Menongue at the earliest possible opportunity.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25077
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have received news that Serbian forces have removed from a United Nations armoured vehicle Mr. Hakkija Turajlic, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Economic Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and killed him on the spot. The Deputy Prime Minister was returning from the airport after greeting Mr. Orhan Kilercioğlu, Minister of State of the Republic of Turkey, who was accompanying a shipment of humanitarian aid from the Government of Turkey to the people of Sarajevo.

This is a further manifestation of the brazen violations by the Serbian forces of all norms of civilized behaviour and a new challenge to UNPROFOR and the United Nations.

I am under instructions by my Government to call for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to respond to this new provocation which is part of a consistent pattern of crimes against humanity committed by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the last nine months.

(Signed) Mustafa AKŞIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

93-01305 3740f (E) 080193

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25078
9 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The purpose of this letter is to report to you and through you to the members of the Security Council on the latest developments relating to implementation of the provisions of the Peace Accords for El Salvador concerning the purification of the Armed Forces (S/23501, annex, chap. I, sect. 3).

It will be recalled that in my letter to the President of the Security Council of 13 November 1992 (S/24805) I reported on arrangements which had been successfully concluded with the Government and the FMLN to bring the armed conflict in El Salvador formally to an end on 15 December 1992. Those arrangements included agreement by President Cristiani to complete implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification of the Armed Forces within a specified time-frame. In particular, President Cristiani had agreed to inform me by 29 November 1992 of the administrative decisions he had taken on this matter. As I subsequently reported to the Security Council in paragraph 3 (d) of my report of 23 December 1992 (S/25006), the administrative decisions were punctually communicated to me by President Cristiani. In his letter, President Cristiani informed me that he had adopted administrative decisions concerning all the officers included in the Ad Hoc Commission's report. These decisions would be made known on 31 December 1992 at the latest and would become effective as of 1 January 1993.

On 5 January 1993, in my absence in Africa, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations and my Senior Political Adviser received, by and of Dr. Oscar Santamaria, Minister of the Presidency, and General Mauricio Vargas, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, a letter dated 1 January 1993 in which President Cristiani conveyed to me details of the measures adopted to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission.

The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission concerned 103 officers. One of these was no longer a serving member of the Armed Forces. Of the remaining 102 officers, it was recommended that 26 should be transferred to other

functions and 76 should be discharged. President Cristiani informed me in his letter that the following measures had been adopted in relation to 94 of these 102 officers:

(1) Twenty-five officers had been transferred to other functions;

(2) Four officers had been discharged for disciplinary reasons (one of them being the 26th officer recommended for a transfer to other functions);

(3) Nineteen officers had been discharged for administrative reasons;

(4) Thirty-eight officers had been placed on leave with pay, pending completion of the procedures for their retirement which would take place within a period not exceeding six months;

(5) Seven officers had been appointed as Military Attachés to Salvadorian embassies abroad;

(6) One officer had, for personal reasons, been permitted to remain in active service until he retired on 1 March 1993.

President Cristiani's letter went on to say that administrative decisions relating to the other eight officers would be deferred during "the period of transition", which is understood to mean during the remainder of President Cristiani's mandate as President of the Republic.

Enclosed with President Cristiani's letter were copies of the administrative orders relating to categories (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) above. I have verified that the names correspond with those in the report of the Ad Hoc Commission.

Having carefully studied President Cristiani's letter and its enclosures, I have come to the following conclusions:

(a) The measures adopted in relation to categories (1), (2) and (3) above comply fully with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission;

(b) The measures adopted in relation to categories (4) and (6) also comply broadly with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission. The officers concerned will not perform any official functions with effect from 1 January 1993, but their discharge will not become effective until the legal formalities for their retirement are complete, which could in some cases take as long as six months. I nevertheless consider that these measures can be accepted as satisfactory in the circumstances;

(c) The appointment of the seven officers in category (5) to Military Attaché posts does not comply with the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations which require these officers to be discharged;

(d) The deferral of decisions relating to the remaining eight officers is similarly not in compliance with the Commission's recommendations.

I have from the outset been conscious of the particular difficulty and sensitivity of this aspect of the Peace Accords. As indicated above, I am ready to accept as satisfactory the measures adopted and implemented by the Government of El Salvador with respect to 87 of the 102 officers covered by the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations, even though a number of them do not conform in all respects with those recommendations. However, the measures adopted in respect of the other 15 officers do not comply with those recommendations and are thus not in conformity with the Peace Accords. The mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council requires me to seek full compliance by each side with all the commitments it has entered into in signing the Peace Accords. I have therefore asked President Cristiani to take early action to regularize the position of the 15 officers in respect of whom the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations have not yet been fully implemented.

I shall continue to report to the Security Council as appropriate on the implementation of this and other aspects of the Peace Accords.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25079
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3159th meeting, held on 8 January 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina":

"The Security Council is profoundly shocked to learn of the killing of Mr. Hakija Turajlic, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Bosnian-Serb forces, while he was under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

"The Council strongly condemns this outrageous act of terrorism which is a grave violation of international humanitarian law and a flagrant challenge to the authority and the inviolability of UNPROFOR, as well as to the serious efforts undertaken with the aim of achieving an overall political settlement of the crisis.

"The Council urges all parties and others concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from taking any action which might further exacerbate the situation.

"The Council requests the Secretary-General to undertake a full investigation of the incident and to report to it without delay. Upon receipt of that report the Council will consider the matter forthwith.

"The members of the Security Council extend their sincere condolences to the bereaved family of Mr. Turajlic and to the people and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25080
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3160th meeting, held on 8 January 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina":

"The Security Council fully supports the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia aimed at achieving an overall political settlement of the crisis through a complete cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a constitutional framework for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this connection, the Council reaffirms the need to respect fully the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"The Council fully endorses the view of the Secretary-General described in his report (S/25050) that it is the duty of all the parties involved in the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the recent provocation, to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen in bringing this conflict to an end swiftly.

"The Council appeals to all the parties involved to cooperate to the fullest with the peace efforts and warns any party which would oppose an overall political settlement against the consequences of such an attitude; lack of cooperation and non-compliance with its relevant resolutions will compel the Security Council to review the situation in an urgent and most serious manner, and to consider further necessary measures."

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25081
8 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3161st meeting, held on 8 January 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait":

"The Security Council is deeply disturbed by the Government of Iraq's recent Notes to the Office of the Special Commission in Baghdad and to the Headquarters of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) that it will not allow the United Nations to transport its personnel into Iraqi territory using its own aircraft.

"The Security Council refers to resolution 687 (1991) requiring Iraq to permit the Special Commission and the IAEA to undertake immediate on-site inspection of any locations designated by the Commission. The agreement on facilities, privileges and immunities between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, and resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) elaborated on Iraq's obligations by demanding, inter alia, that the Special Commission and the IAEA be allowed, as they determined necessary, to use their own aircraft throughout Iraq and any airfield in Iraq without interference or hindrance of any kind. Concerning UNIKOM, Iraq is obligated by resolution 687 (1991) and committed by an exchange of letters dated 15 April 1992 and 21 June 1992 respectively to the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of transport.

"The implementation of the measures set out in the recent communications of the Iraqi Government would seriously impede the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. Such restrictions constitute an unacceptable and material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as other relevant resolutions and agreements.

"The Council demands that the Government of Iraq abide by its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and cooperate fully with the activities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and UNIKOM. In particular, it demands that the Government of Iraq not interfere with the currently envisaged United Nations flights. The Security Council warns the Government of Iraq, as it has done in this connection in the past, of the serious consequences which would ensue from failure to comply with its obligations."

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25082
9 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) and paragraph 1 of resolution 780 (1992), as well as in the light of resolution 798 (1992), I have the honour to submit, enclosed herewith, an addition to our earlier submissions of documents concerning war crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

I would kindly request that you arrange that this letter and the first four pages of the present submission ("The extent of violation of women's human rights and raping as a new type of war crime in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina", dated 30 December 1992) be circulated as a document of the Security Council and that the entire material be made available to interested delegations.*

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

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* The material may be consulted in room S-3520.

Annex

THE EXTENT OF VIOLATION OF WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS AND RAPING AS A NEW TYPE OF WAR CRIME IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Medical documentation

This report is based on data of the University Clinics of the School of Medicine of the University of Zagreb as well as on the documentation of major medical centres in Croatia; this report does not encompass individual cases treated in oupatient medical institutions or outside the gynaecological and obstetric wards. It is extremely hard to obtain medical documentation on that issue due to the following reasons: the rapings were not systematically reported during the aggression against Croatia and only a small fraction of cases of mass raping of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina were reported. Presently, we have collected 20 cases of raped women with complete medical documentation as well as an additional 80 cases of raped women with currently incomplete documentation.

Enclosed one can find the description of several illustrative cases (filed and stored under the following codes: SIL-425, SIL-426, SIL-427, SIL-428, SIL-429, SIL-430, SIL-431, SIL-438) as well as characteristic individual written testimonies of raped victims (testimonies under the codes SIL-60, SIL-61, SIL-202, SIL-414, SIL-415, SIL-418, SIL-419, SIL-420, SIL-421).

Timing

Before 2 April 1992 raping occurred within the occupied parts of Croatia, especially in the present UNPROFOR Sectors East, West and North. The major sites of raping of captured women were private camps held by local Serbian paramilitaries but one has to emphasize that women from the Vukovar area were raped in the concentration camps of Begejci and Stajićevo situated in Vojvodina, Serbia, (autumn and winter 1991) in which almost 2,000 civilians from the Vukovar area were imprisoned. After 2 April 1992 (i.e. after the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina) mass rapings of predominantly Muslim women became a widespread phenomenon in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, only now has the time arrived in which we are able to record the most unfortunate consequence of those brutal violations of women's rights - advanced pregnancies and deliveries of unwanted babies. From the timing of events, it is obvious that this will emerge as a mass phenomenon in the near future.

Raping as a tool for ethnic cleansing: a new kind of war crime

The spatial pattern and time schedule of brutal and mass raping clearly demonstrate that mass raping served as a tool for ethnic cleansing - mass rapings occurred in the initial phase of ethnic cleansing in those areas from which Muslims and Croats were later completely expelled (Bijeljina, Zvornik, Foča, Višegrad, Prijedor, Kozarac, Doboj, Modriča). Furthermore, mass rapings occurred in the areas flanking the major routes of Serbian military operations serving to expand the "pure Serbian land". Finally, there are clear signs of "synchronized action": mass raping occurred in several places in the same way, leading to the same consequences.

Total number of rape victims

In contrast to the limited number of cases recorded with complete medical documentation, there are many more written testimonies and survivor or eyewitness reports, all indicating clearly that raping is a mass phenomenon and a widespread form of war crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is obvious from that documentation that at least several thousand women were exposed to brutal raping and maltreatment. However, the total number of raped and tortured women is definitely much higher - at least half of the people detained in camps controlled by the Bosnian Serbian Army were women and about one third of them were obviously raped; therefore one can estimate that there were at least 10,000 raped and tortured women until now (estimation based on the following data: at least 60,000 people were detained in Serbian camps, half of whom were women; one third of that is about 10,000). Finally, official sources from Bosnia and Herzegovina claim that according to their evidence the total number of raped women is even higher - estimates range to up to 60,000 raped women!

Types of raping and types of detention "brothels" and camps

Systematic raping in Bosnia is a specific method of torture, functioning as a tool of psychological warfare and ethnic cleansing. The rape is directed and serves the practical aims of aggression and conquest of the new territory.

Place: raping occurred (a) within the occupied territory and (b) in various kinds of detention places.

Phenomenology: rapings were brutal and performed in front of as many people as possible, frequently in combination with arbitrary executions and massacres.

Basic scenario: Bosnian Serbian Army units occupy the village/town and establish the so-called "military authorities" consisting of local Chetniks who know both the area and the people. These "authorities" start to prepare lists of non-Serbians and mark their homes; arbitrary arrests, beating,

murders, deportation of all men into detention camps and raping of remaining women (including very young girls and elderly women) follow, the perpetrators being either mercenaries or local members of Serbian paramilitary units. Finally, high-ranking Yugoslav Army officers arrive, offering to the terrified people permission to leave (in order "to protect them"). Terrified people of course accept this as their only chance to survive and, as a consequence, Serbs got an ethnically cleansed territory while surrounding countries got a huge number of refugees.

Raping in detention places: mixed camps (containing detainees of both sexes) were characteristic of Serbia and occupied parts of Croatia, while camps with exclusively female detainees are a feature characteristic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The characteristic features of brutal rapings are as follows:

(a) Women were raped many times by many perpetrators, physically tortured and simultaneously forced to do fellatio and to swallow the sperm;

(b) Women were frequently raped in front of their first relatives (husband, children, parents) and they were also frequently disfigured, cut with knives or simply shot;

(c) A group of women were locked up and repeatedly raped by a number of perpetrators and at least in some cases mother and daughter were raped simultaneously.

Consequences: The outcome of sexual abuse and maltreatment can be as follows:

(a) The victim stays alive but suffers from serious psychological and physical consequences, frequently aggravated by the fact that one or more members of her family were killed;

(b) The victim is killed. Furthermore, some victims became pregnant and we recorded three sorts of consequences: (i) abortion is performed on the enemy side (usually they had to pay a lot of money for that); (ii) the victim is released soon enough to perform a legal abortion and (iii) the victim is kept in detention until abortion becomes legally impossible.

Age and nationality of victims

The majority of rape victims were Muslim women, ranging in age from a 6-year-old girl to an 80-year-old woman. They can be categorized as follows: (a) below 14 years of age, i.e. children (especially frequent in Bosnia and Herzegovina), (b) married or unmarried fertile women and (c) elderly women. It seems that within occupied parts of Croatia the most frequent victims of rape were fertile women, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina the most frequent victims of raping were quite young girls, teenagers or even children who were driven to brothel-camps and treated there like white slaves. Several such brothel camps were registered: Vilina Vlas and Bikavac in Višegrad, Brezovo

Polje near Brčko, Vogošća, Vrace Grbavica, Kula, Pale, Hadžići and Ilijaš, all around Sarajevo; Kalinovik, Kotor Varoš, Foča, Prijedor, Rogatica, Zvornik, Šekovići and Nevesinje.

Zagreb, 30 December 1992

For the Division of Information
and Research, Ministry of Health
of the Republic of Croatia:

Dr. Miloš JUDAŠ, M.D.

For the School of Medicine,
University of Zagreb:

Professor Ivica KOSTOVIĆ,
M.D., D.Sc., Dean

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/25083
9 January 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 4 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Rwandese Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the Organization and, with reference to his note verbale of 26 October 1992, has the honour to inform him that there are no Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products in the territory of the Rwandese Republic, nor any funds of the Iraqi Government, or of its State bodies, corporations or agencies, that represent the proceeds of the sale of petroleum or petroleum products covered by the provisions of resolution 778 (1992) adopted by the Security Council on 2 October 1992.

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S/25084
9 January 1993
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NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to inform him as follows.

With reference to Security Council resolution 787 (1992), on 21 December 1992 the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic adopted decision No. 710, which provides for the strengthening of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

In accordance with the above-mentioned decision, the Ministries and authorities of Ukraine, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, and the regional, Kiev and Sebastopol administrations, enterprises, associations, organizations and institutions engaged in transshipment across the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tyres, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types are instructed to ensure the implementation of the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 787 (1992) and to take the necessary measures to keep to the minimum any potential losses of Ukraine in that regard.

The decision also requires the aforementioned institutions to make available to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine any necessary information on measures to implement Security Council resolution 787 (1992).

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations requests that this note be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

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S/25085
10 January 1993
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

SPECIAL REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

1. I wish to report to the Security Council a number of serious developments concerning the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

2. Firstly, this morning at about 0700 hours local time, a party of some 200 Iraqis with trucks and heavy loading equipment forced entry into the six ammunition bunkers located in a former Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr, on Kuwaiti territory, and took away most of their contents, including four "HY-2G" anti-ship missiles.

3. UNIKOM, which had maintained a 24-hour guard over the bunkers, made an effort to prevent access to them but was unable to do so. UNIKOM then attempted to prevent the Iraqi trucks loaded with items from the bunkers from leaving the scene by placing United Nations vehicles in their path. After some manoeuvring, the Iraqis surrounded the United Nations vehicles, preventing them from moving without seriously injuring or killing Iraqi personnel. The Iraqis then breached the fence and left.

4. At the first news of this incident, UNIKOM's Chief Military Observer, Major-General Timothy K. Dibuama, summoned the Senior Iraqi Liaison Officer at Umm Qasr and protested to him this serious violation. He also instructed UNIKOM's Chief Liaison Officer in Baghdad to lodge a formal protest with the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In their contacts with the Iraqi authorities, General Dibuama and his representatives pointed out that the Iraqi personnel, without prior clearance, had entered an area which is now known to be Kuwaiti territory and had contravened the Security Council's decision, laid down in the President's letter of 3 November 1992, that the contents of the bunkers should be destroyed by UNIKOM or by a specialized firm acting at UNIKOM's request and under its supervision.

5. Secondly, General Dibuama has reported that up to 500 Iraqi personnel continued today to dismantle prefabricated buildings in the former naval base, also on Kuwaiti territory, and to remove the parts and other items. This

activity is in violation of the procedure established by the Security Council and conveyed to me in the President's letter of 8 January 1993. A copy of this letter was sent to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations the same day and General Dibuama informed the Senior Iraqi Liaison Officer in Umm Qasr one day later, that is yesterday.

6. General Dibuama has kept the Kuwaiti authorities informed of the above developments. He has stationed observers at the crossing points along the border in the Umm Qasr area with instructions to stop approaching Iraqis, to warn them that they are about to enter Kuwaiti territory, and to describe to them the procedure established by the Security Council for the removal of Iraqi property and assets.

7. Thirdly, I wish to report that in a meeting at Umm Qasr on 4 January 1993, Major-General Abdallah Firas, the Chairman of Iraq's Higher Committee for Coordination which is responsible for liaison with UNIKOM, raised with General Dibuama the question of the retrieval by Iraq of the prefabricated buildings which Iraq had made available to UNIKOM in a part of the former naval base (Camp Khor). General Dibuama referred this question to United Nations Headquarters and my colleagues have raised it with the Permanent Representative of Iraq, asking that his Government stop the workers. They have suggested that the matter be discussed, with a view to finding an agreed solution which would preserve UNIKOM's ability to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. The Permanent Representative had not yet responded when, on 9 January, General Firas informed General Dibuama that on 11 January the dismantling of prefabricated buildings in the former naval base would be extended to include the buildings used by UNIKOM. General Firas suggested that UNIKOM evacuate these premises.

8. The premises in question consist of 19 buildings, which house such elements as the UNIKOM's northern sector headquarters, helicopter support, and transport workshops. Others are used for the accommodation of personnel. Additional prefabricated buildings have been added by UNIKOM. I should like to point out that, by an exchange of letters, respectively dated 15 April and 21 June 1992, the Government of Iraq has agreed that the land and premises it has made available to UNIKOM shall be inviolate and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the United Nations.

9. The above developments are taking place at a time when the Security Council is already actively seized of other aspects of the situation, such as Iraq's ban against United Nations aircraft. They cast doubt on Iraq's continued willingness to cooperate with UNIKOM and to abide by the commitments it has undertaken in this respect. As the Security Council is aware, Iraq's cooperation is essential for UNIKOM to perform its tasks effectively. It is for this reason that I am bringing these matters to the Council's attention.

Annex I

Letter dated 8 January 1993 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 23 December 1992, in which you brought to the Council's attention some issues arising from the demarcation of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. The members of the Council considered this matter in the course of consultations of the whole on 5 January 1993 and asked me to convey to you the following:

The members of the Council concur with the general approach outlined in your letter. They are particularly concerned at the continued presence of six Iraqi police posts on Kuwaiti territory and insist on their speedy removal, by 15 January at the latest. They also note the unsafe proximity to the boundary of three other Iraqi posts and two Kuwaiti police posts.

The members have also before them a letter dated 4 January 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations and they have since taken note of UNIKOM's weekly report for the period 28 December 1992-3 January 1993. They believe the presence of Iraqi military personnel in the demilitarized zone was a serious violation of resolution 687 (1991). They also consider that the removal of the Iraqi property and assets from Kuwaiti territory should be undertaken only after prior clearance by UNIKOM and by the Kuwaiti authorities through UNIKOM and should be completed by 15 January 1993. The members of the Council would be obliged if you would keep them informed of development in these matters.

(Signed) Yoshio HATANO
President of the Security Council

Annex II

Letter dated 23 December 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the situation in the area of operation of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), following the placement of the border pillars along the land boundary between Iraq and Kuwait by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission. The demarcation of the land boundary is thus nearly complete, except for minor technical matters.

I consider it timely, therefore, to bring to the Council's attention some issues arising from the demarcation of the boundary. These concern six Iraqi police posts, part of the Iraqi town of Umm Qasr, several Iraqi farms along the eastern part of the boundary and some well heads of the Ratqah oil field, all of which have been shown to be on Kuwaiti territory.

The issue of the Iraqi police posts on Kuwaiti territory was first raised with the Iraqi authorities more than one year ago. At that time, the boundary had not yet been demarcated and the Iraqi authorities maintained that they could not withdraw the posts as this might prejudice their position regarding the boundary. They stated, however, that they would abide by the decision of the Boundary Demarcation Commission. This assurance has recently been repeated. I have requested the Iraqi authorities to withdraw the six police posts from Kuwaiti territory as soon as possible and I have instructed Major-General Dibuama, the Chief Military Observer of UNIKOM, to be in touch with those authorities regarding the necessary arrangements.

Three Iraqi police posts and two Kuwaiti police posts are now closer to the boundary than 1,000 metres, which UNIKOM, with the concurrence of both sides, has established as a reasonable distance to prevent incidents. Persistent complaints about shooting incidents involving police posts underline the continuing validity of this rule. I have accordingly instructed Major-General Dibuama to arrange with the authorities concerned that the police posts in question be moved further away from the boundary at an early date.

The issue of the Iraqi citizens and their assets which remain on Kuwaiti territory is potentially volatile and apt to give rise to increased tension and friction unless resolved soon. At the same time, it is clearly in the interest of all involved that this issue be settled in a reasonable way. I am in touch with the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait in order to promote such a settlement and to determine how the United Nations may help to bring it about. I trust that the Security Council concurs with this approach and shall keep it informed of the results of my contacts.

I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex III

Letter dated 3 November 1992 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

The members of the Security Council have examined the question you brought to the attention of the President through your letter dated 23 September 1992. They fully share the concerns expressed by the UNIKOM Commander related to the threats to security linked to the presence of Iraqi and Kuwaiti military equipment in six bunkers within the demilitarized zone, near the headquarters of the Observation Mission. The members of the Security Council deem it necessary, as recommended by the Commander of the Observation Mission, for the bunkers to be emptied of their contents.

The members of the Security Council have noted that UNIKOM has carried out, within the demilitarized zone where it is deployed, destruction of mines and ammunition that might be harmful to the observers (your reports S/22454, approved by resolution 689 (1991), S/23106, S/23766 and S/24615). They are of the opinion that the military equipment referred to in your letter dated 23 September 1992, which also represents a threat to the security of the members of the Observation Mission, should similarly be destroyed by UNIKOM or by a specialized company acting upon the request of the Mission and under its supervision.

In the event of UNIKOM entrusting a specific company with the destruction of the military equipment contained in the six bunkers, the cost of this operation should not be covered by the regular budget of UNIKOM but by Iraq and Kuwait. Each of these two States should support the financial burden related to the destruction of the contents of the bunkers located on its territory, i.e. on its side of the border as demarcated by the Boundary Demarcation Commission.

The members of the Security Council are of the opinion that it would be useful for UNIKOM to consult the Special Commission to enable the latter to check whether any of the military equipment contained in the six bunkers fall into the category mentioned in paragraph 8 of resolution 687. In this case, this equipment should be destroyed by the Special Commission, in coordination with UNIKOM.

(Signed) André ERDOS
President of the Security Council

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S/25085/Add.1
19 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

Addendum

1. The Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) has reported that the Iraqi authorities have withdrawn the six police posts that were located on Kuwaiti territory.

2. The withdrawal was announced to UNIKOM in the afternoon of 17 January. The Iraqi police personnel withdrew with their equipment that evening and dismantled and removed three of the posts. The next morning, they returned and removed the other three posts. This happened under UNIKOM's supervision and with the agreement of the Kuwaiti authorities, which UNIKOM had consulted. UNIKOM has inspected the six sites and has reported that everything has been removed.

3. As of midday on Wednesday, 13 January 1993, the retrieval of Iraqi assets from Kuwaiti territory has ceased.

4. In my letter of 23 December 1992 (see S/25085, annex II), I mentioned that three Iraqi police posts, as well as two Kuwaiti police posts, were closer to the boundary than 1,000 metres, which has been established as a reasonable distance to prevent incidents. Through an oversight, these figures did not include two Iraqi police posts that were set up in the central sector in early December 1992. UNIKOM had asked that these posts also should be moved further from the boundary. In Umm Qasr, where the boundary runs through a built-up area, three police check-points and a border post are also within the 1,000-metre range.

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Security Council

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S/25086
10 January 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 10 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour of transmitting to you herewith a letter dated 9 January 1993 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the Security Council statement of 8 January 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the attached letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, referred to above, circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 9 January 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to the Security Council statement of 8 January 1993, I wish to clarify the following points:

1. The decision which we notified to the Special Commission concerning the discontinuance of the use of foreign aircraft for its operations is a temporary decision dictated by the United States threats to Iraq. Any foreign flights in Iraqi airspace will be surrounded by danger in the present circumstances.

2. We have already requested the Chairman of the Special Commission to use Iraqi aircraft for United Nations missions in Iraq and have discussed the need for so doing with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Special Commission does not have its own aircraft, as the note of Mr. Rolf Ekéus tries to suggest, but leases aircraft from States for the said missions. Why, then, does it not lease aircraft from Iraq?

While Iraqi aircraft stand parked and rusting in the airports of various countries, the United Nations leases foreign aircraft at Iraq's expense. Ignoring this request by Iraq shows arbitrariness and amounts to a deliberate refusal to comply with a legitimate request. Our request in this connection must be given earnest consideration.

3. The allegation that Iraq has stopped or hampered the missions of the Special Commission in Iraq is incorrect. The United Nations teams can either use Iraqi aircraft as they are available or come by land (via Amman-Baghdad). All Iraqis and Iraqi high officials use that means when travelling.

The people and Government of Iraq cannot consider the United Nations teams as higher in rank than the citizens of Iraq and Iraqi officials.

The dealings of the United Nations with a free and sovereign State ought to be marked by propriety. The insolent manner adopted by some of those in charge of United Nations missions is absolutely unacceptable, and it is this that should be condemned, not the legitimate positions and requests of an independent country that is a founding Member of the United Nations.

I hope that this letter will be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq
Baghdad, 9 January 1993

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General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL

A/47/859
S/25087
11 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 143
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 8 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Mr. Hakija Turajlic, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was murdered today by Serbian extremists while he was under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Mr. Turajlic was returning from Butmir airport in an UNPROFOR vehicle escorted by other UNPROFOR vehicles on a United Nations controlled road. The UNPROFOR convoy was blocked by two tanks belonging to aggressor forces, and Mr. Turajlic was shot eight times while sitting in the vehicle.

It is my understanding that UNPROFOR was not to stop under any circumstances or to open their vehicles for inspection by aggressor forces. The astonishing circumstances of Mr. Turajlic's murder require a full explanation of the conduct of UNPROFOR at the time of the murder. Please accept this letter as a demand for such an explanation.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 143, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25088
5 January 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace for the purpose of surveillance and provocation during the period from 29 December 1992 to 5 January 1993, as follows.

29-30 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 31 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-10,000 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Dukan, Irbil and Rawanduz.

- At 0948, 1517 and 1620 hours on 30 December 1992, United States aircraft dropped heat flares north of Mosul and over Faruq airfield.

(b) Southern region: 78 sorties, flown by F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,500-11,000 m, centred over Basra, Amarah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Nasiriyah, Salman and southern Diwaniyah.

- At 0317 and 0459 hours on 30 December 1992, United States F-16 aircraft broke the sound barrier over Nasiriyah at an altitude of 8,000 m.

30-31 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 33 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

- At 2050 hours on 31 December 1992, United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over Firnas airfield in Mosul.

(b) Southern region: 62 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Shatrah, Khidr, Artawi and Busayyah.

31 December 1992-1 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Zakho, Tall Afar, Dukan and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 70 sorties, flown by TR-1, AWACS, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,500-20,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Busayyah, Ushbayjah, Salman, Nisf, Nukhayb, Jalibah and Janub al-Janub.

A United States TR-1 aircraft engaged in hostile reconnaissance in the southern region, entering at 1205 hours on 1 January 1993 and departing at 1340 hours. It flew at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m.

1-2 January 1993

(a) Northern region: No air activity was recorded in the region on this day.

(b) Southern region: 77 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-10,500 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Qurnah, Busayyah, Salman and Artawi.

2-3 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 24 sorties, flown at speeds of 700-800 km/h and at altitudes of 6,500-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho and Tall Afar.

At 1555 hours on 2 January 1993, a hostile formation dropped heat flares on an area near Taklif in Ninawa governorate.

At 1550 hours on 2 January 1993, two United States aircraft dropped 15 heat flares on an area near Fayidah north of Mosul.

(b) Southern region: 41 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Basra, Samawah, Jalibah, Khidr, Artawi and Busayyah.

- A United States TR-1 aircraft engaged in hostile reconnaissance in the southern region, entering the airspace at 1146 hours and departing at 1438 hours on 2 January 1993. It flew at an altitude of 20,000 m.

3-4 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 31 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 62 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-8,500 m, centred on Basra, Artawi, Jalibah, Salman, Nasiriyah and Samawah.

4-5 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 40 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 and at altitudes of 4,000-10,000 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Northern region: 64 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 720-840 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-8,000 m, centred on Samawah, Nasiriyah, Jalibah, Artawi, Qurnah, Khidr, Amarah, Busayyah, Shatrah and Salman.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly Security Council

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~~A/47/862~~
S/25089
11 January 1993

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
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THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 10 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I want to express my deep gratitude to General Phillipe Morillon, Commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina Command, for his prompt release of information related to the death of Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic, who was murdered by Serb and Montenegrin occupation forces while under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on 8 January 1993.

Nevertheless, we are extremely troubled by the fact that UNPROFOR permitted the interception of the armoured personnel carrier carrying Deputy Prime Minister Turajlic. The Deputy Prime Minister was murdered in full view of UNPROFOR forces, which had clearly acquiesced to the aggressor's demand that the vehicle be opened and that its occupants be identified. The United Nations Protection Force acted more as a submissive hostage than as a protection force, clearly failing to use any forceful and/or preventive measures to resist this unlawful interception.

The astonishing circumstances leading to Mr. Turajlic's murder while under UNPROFOR protection demonstrate plainly that, too often, the United Nations Protection Force offers neither protection nor force. UNPROFOR unfortunately labours under a constricted mandate, passive rules of engagement and inadequate political support. These factors have proven to be grossly counterproductive, permitting occupation forces to use UNPROFOR as an unwitting vehicle of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR's unwillingness or inability to carry out its mandate to use all necessary force for the purpose of delivering humanitarian aid, given in Security Council resolution 770 (1992), is perhaps the best example of the inadequate level of political support provided to UNPROFOR.

Whereas General Morillon reports that all sides were contacted during the two-hour negotiations for passage of the vehicle, there can be no doubt that the murder of Mr. Turajlic was supported at the highest levels of Serb extremist leadership in Belgrade and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Considering the time permitted for negotiations, we cannot accept the theory that a single soldier is responsible for the murder.

The aggressors have taken every opportunity to exploit UNPROFOR's constricted mandate and, as we often see, negotiations simply facilitate their violent objectives.

Mr. Turajlic's interception and murder on a road controlled by UNPROFOR demonstrates the manifest necessity of correcting UNPROFOR's mandate and rules of engagement and of obtaining proper political support for its work if it is to function as a genuine protection force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We therefore urge you to demand this from the Security Council in order to prevent further occurrences of UNPROFOR, which is under Your Excellency's command, being used as an unwitting vehicle of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 143, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

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LETTER DATED 11 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter dated 31 December 1992 (S/25041) I have the honour to enclose herewith a second message from His Excellency, Mr. Ali Sahloul, Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Sudan, No. WKh/MT/1-1/6 dated 7 January 1993 concerning the same subject.

I would be grateful if this message could be distributed to the member States as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmed SULIMAN
Permanent Representative

Annex I

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 7 January 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to our note No. WKh/MT/1-1/16 dated 27 December 1992 concerning the aggression by the Arab Republic of Egypt against the Sudanese area of Halayib, I wish to provide you with more details concerning the developments relating the Egyptian aggression against the territory of Halayib, which is aimed at imposing a fait accompli and may lead to the escalation of armed confrontation between the two countries. This constitutes a threat to peace and security in the area, while the Sudan is anxious to resolve the dispute between the two countries concerning the Halayib area by peaceful and friendly means and within the framework of the fraternal and historic relations between them:

1. Since the beginning of 1991, Egyptian movements in the area of the Halayib triangle have been observed as indicating Egyptian intentions to occupy the area. With the steady increase in border violations by Egyptian officials, those intentions became clear, particularly when the Egyptian authorities, in November 1991, called for the lowering of the Sudanese flag that had been raised over the peace point at Shalatayn. In order to avoid friction, it was agreed that both the Sudanese and Egyptian flags should be lowered.

2. On 12 December 1991, a 150-man Egyptian force, under a major, attacked the Sudanese peace post at Shalatayn. The premises were demolished, the building materials were removed to inside Egyptian territory, and the remains were destroyed on the site.

3. In March 1992, the Egyptian authorities sent a 120-man detachment and established the Badi' 11 post 68 kilometres to the north of Halayib.

4. The events of April 1992 (Abu Ramad incident)

At 0800 hours on 4 April 1992, an Egyptian force riding in three jeeps attacked the Abu Ramad police post. That attack resulted in the deaths of two policemen and the wounding of three others. At 1100 hours, the Egyptian force withdrew from the police post, taking with it the post's weapons. The Egyptian authorities claimed that the incident was an isolated one and that the Government was in no way connected with it. They charged the officer who carried it out with misconduct and promised to impose the most severe penalties on him.

5. Military escalation following the events of April 1992

(a) On 7 July 1992, three armed jeeps under an officer with the rank of lieutenant-colonel proceeded along the coastal road.

(b) On the same date, a fixed hangar was built at the Badi' 11 post, and electricity poles were erected on the road in the village of Abu Ramad.

(c) At 0200 hours on 21 July 1992, the Egyptian Minister of Health visited Abu Ramad escorted by a force led by a lieutenant-colonel and seven jeeps.

(d) At 1230 hours on 22 July 1992, a force led by a colonel and a lieutenant-colonel arrived at Abu Ramad and set off in the direction of Bi'r Shalatayn.

(e) At 0930 hours on 23 July 1992, another force arrived with 12 armoured vehicles and likewise departed in the direction of Bi'r Shalatayn.

(f) At 0745 hours on 26 July 1992, an Egyptian military vessel anchored 7 kilometres from the Halayib naval station and departed at 1200 hours on the same day.

(g) On 29 July 1992, four Egyptian trucks carrying timber and iron girders discharged their loads to the east of the Abu Ramad post.

(h) On 29 July, an Egyptian boat arrived in the Abu Ramad area. Its crew measured sea depths and then positioned signs on the coast in front of Abu Ramad.

(i) In the period from 29 July to 1 August 1992, there were three military jeeps, under a colonel called Abd al-Aziz al-Ḍib, travelling from the Badi' 11 post to Jabal Aqumtari and 40 kilometres further north. The men were surveying the land, drawing maps and erecting signs in cement and lime.

(j) At 0700 hours on 1 August 1992, an Egyptian HAL aircraft, under the command of Brigadier-General Abd al-Mu'in, Chief of Staff for the southern region, landed in the Abu Ramad area.

(k) On 1 August 1992, a man called Salah Amir, who was appointed head of the village of Abu Ramad by the Egyptian authorities, came to Abu Ramad. It is well known that he holds the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Egyptian intelligence service.

(l) At 0100 hours on 13 August 1992, a 30-man Egyptian force riding on seven lorries arrived in Abu Ramad.

(m) On 17 August 1992, a 20-man Egyptian force assembled in the Shalatayn area. The men carried Kalashnikovs and DShk machine-guns.

(n) The Egyptian authorities requested permission for their aircraft to enter Sudanese airspace to search for three vehicles lost in the desert. From 0130 until 0300 hours on 21 August 1992, three aircraft made flights at low altitude over Wadi Halfa airfield and the area including the Halayib triangle, their purpose being reconnaissance and photography.

6. Recent military escalation

(a) On 1 October 1992, the Egyptian forces conducted manoeuvres on the southern boundary in the area north of Shalatayn. The purpose of the manoeuvres was to train forces for the operation of restoring occupation of the disputed area. The manoeuvres were tended by the Minister of Defence and the Egyptian Chief of Staff.

(b) On the afternoon of 24 November 1992, an Egyptian force, estimated to number 600 men and riding in 20 Land Cruisers and four armoured vehicles, passed by. The force divided into two sections, the first moving westwards towards the direction of the mountains and the second eastwards towards the coast.

(c) In the period from 15 to 24 November 1992, the Egyptian forces opened six new military posts in the area extending 18 kilometres southwards from Abu Ramad. The force manning those posts is estimated at 120 men.

(d) At 1020 hours on 30 November 1992, a HAL aircraft landed at the Abu Ramad airstrip. It carried nine high-ranking officers, carried out reconnaissance over an area up to 6 kilometres from Halayib. The aircraft then took off at 1330 hours on the same day.

(e) On 6 December 1992, a HAL aircraft overflew the town of Halayib at low altitude and took photographs of the town, concentrating on the camps. It then flew to Abu Ramad, where it landed. On board were 15 military men of various ranks, who boarded small jeeps and proceeded southwards to reconnoitre the area until they arrived at the outskirts of the town of Halayib.

7. On 9 December 1992, the following occurred.

(a) At 0430 hours, an Egyptian force estimated to number 250 men arrived within 3 kilometres of Halayib.

(b) At 0500 hours, a 120-men force led by a brigadier-general, a colonel, a captain and five second lieutenants, with seven jeeps, a Land Cruiser, and four large Russian vehicles, went past the Halayib post. This force encamped on the sides of the Halayib-Port Sudan road 28 kilometres south of Halayib. The force then encamped in the form of a triangle having its apex on 22nd parallel of latitude. Then the force proceeded to position border signs from east to west along the 22nd parallel, marked with numerals from 1 to 5, at 7-kilometre intervals. On the northern side the word "Egypt" was written and on the southern side the word "Sudan".

(c) At midnight, a tanker vessel arrived and discharged its load of water at Abu Ramad.

8. At 0700 hours on 10 December, the administrative forces proceeded to supply their forces deployed to the south of the mountain road. The supply convoy consisted of two jeeps, two tankers with water and fuel and three trucks with supplies of food, weapons and ammunition.

9. On 11 December 1992, a 60-men force pitched 30 tents 14 kilometres to the south of Abu Ramad.

10. On 19 December 1992, a police post under a captain was opened to the west of Abu Ramad.

11. On 21 December 1992, the deployment of heavy machinery was observed 150 kilometres south of Shalatayn over an area of 2.5 square kilometres.

12. At 0630 hours on 21 December 1992, some civilians arrived with a drilling rig and two tents, which were pitched 2 kilometres to the west of the town of Halayib. They said that they wanted to drill, and our forces prevented them from operating. At 1700 hours on 22 December 1992, 20 Egyptian soldiers, under an officer, arrived at the location of the drilling rig. After contacts with the commander of the Halayib forces, the Egyptian force returned to a distance of 4 kilometres from Halayib.

13. On 26 December 1992, the Chairman of the Administrative Board of the Egyptian company arrived at the site of the drilling rig and said that the men were permitted to operate up to the 22nd parallel. After many deliberations on this matter, the group withdrew to a distance of 550 metres to the west.

14. On 28 December 1992, the Egyptian forces south of Halayib were strengthened with a 120-men company, which deployed within the former posts in the triangle, and two posts, with a strength of 30 men, were opened to the north of Abu Ramad.

15. On 2 January 1993, a 120-men company force deployed along the 22nd parallel, a 60-men platoon deployed 5 kilometres south of Halayib, and a 120-men company deployed to the south of Abu Ramad.

16. The total Egyptian forces introduced so far into the Halayib triangle consist of an infantry brigade of élite strike forces estimated to number 2,000 combatants.

17. On 4 January 1993, the Egyptian authorities positioned barrels at the northern entrance to Abu Ramad on the road leading to Shalatayn. A commercial vehicle was intercepted and prevented from passing, and its driver was asked to present a driving licence issued by the Egyptian authorities.

18. At the civilian level, the Egyptian forces behaved as follows:

(a) On 25 February 1992, an Egyptian delegation distributed relief supplies free of charge to citizens in Abu Ramad and continued to open and maintain schools, supply school materials to pupils and distribute notebooks with a map of Halayib on the cover.

(b) On 7 October 1992, work was commenced on the construction of the Abu Ramad Egyptian primary school on a Sudanese school licence, and the guardians of pupils were given the incentive of food and clothing supplies for themselves and their families.

(c) On 9 October 1992, an Egyptian delegation, headed by Major-General Abdullah al-Urayban and comprising 150 persons, went to Abu Ramad. Its members performed the Friday prayer in the Abu Ramad mosque, and a direct broadcast of the prayers was presented on radio and television. In his sermon, the imam focused on references to the location of the prayers: "We are now in the Abu Ramad area, which is 25 kilometres away from Halayib." The delegation returned the same day to Egyptian territory.

(d) On 19 October 1991, the Governor of the Red Sea province arrived in Halayib. He holds the rank of major-general and is called Yusri. He was accompanied by a delegation that included Engineer Hazim al-Sayyid, Deputy Minister for Public Works and Housing, and others. They laid the foundation-stone for what he referred to as the Al-Azhar school at Abu Ramad and 60 housing units and administrative buildings. On the foundation-stone was written "With the aid of God in the time of President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak".

19. Contacts at the leadership level

During the incidents at the Abu Ramad police post in April 1992, to which we have referred above, there were many contacts between the Egyptian Chief of Staff and the Sudanese Chief of Staff and between the Egyptian Director of Military Intelligence and the Sudanese Director of Intelligence. These contacts were made by telephone and through the military attachés in the two countries. They fell within the following framework:

(a) What occurred was regarded as isolated behaviour.

(b) Egypt had sent a committee to investigate, and, if there was evidence of wrongdoing on the part of any of the Egyptian local commanders or if any of them was found to be responsible for the incident, he would be subjected to exemplary punishment.

(c) The Egyptian authorities were ready to pay compensation to the families of martyrs from the Sudanese side.

(d) The Egyptian authorities were ready to host the wounded and provide them with treatment in Egyptian hospitals; a special aircraft could be dispatched to transport them.

(e) The Egyptian authorities had a sincere wish to contain the situation.

20. With regard to the same incident, an Egyptian delegation, headed by a major-general, visited the Sudan for the purpose of condolences. The delegation was met by the Minister of the Interior and some officials. The delegation took full details of the wounded and the dead and provided compensation, which was received through the Director-General of Police.

21. The Egyptian leadership, at the level of the Director of Military Intelligence, transmitted, through repeated telephone contacts and through the military attaché, totally unfounded information about Sudanese movements and the advance of additional Sudanese forces. Normally, such communications would be followed by the dispatch of forces by the Egyptian side and the establishment of additional posts inside the triangle. The Sudanese Government believes that the purpose of these contacts was to cover up the subsequent Egyptian operations in the area.

22. Following the entry of the Egyptian forces into the area south of Halayib on 9 December 1992 and the Sudan's protest about this through our military attaché in Cairo, intensive contacts also began at the level of the Chief of Staff and the Director of Egyptian Intelligence.

What we have indicated above regarding regular military and civilian intervention in Sudanese territory by the Arab Republic of Egypt clearly confirms the latter's intentions of imposing a fait accompli and annexing Halayib to Egypt by force. While affirming the Sudan's desire to pursue all peaceful and friendly means of dealing with this dispute between the two fraternal countries, the Republic of the Sudan reserves the right to use all necessary means, on the basis of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, to defend its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. Accordingly, we hope that your esteemed Council will assume its full responsibility by seeking to ensure the withdrawal of the military and civilian Egyptian presence from the Halayib area and the restoration of the situation that prevailed prior to the commencement of the above-mentioned series of acts of aggression.

(Signed) Ali SAHLOUL
Minister for Foreign Affairs